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Transition to Temporary Labor: 










How does the “World Factory” mediate between the rising labor cost and the 
intensive order fluctuation to maintain its production? While previous studies have 
focused on the politics of production at workplace and types of flexible employment to 
explain the effective control of workers and labor cost, this study argues that more 
attention needs to be paid to the intermediating power of labor market agencies, which 
has become the organizational forces for establishing informal and nonstandard 
employment relations. Based on two-month fieldwork at two labor staffing agencies in 
Shanghai and a yearlong track of changing labor prices in one of the agencies, this study 
finds that a flexible hiring system based on seasonal production has been established to 
maximize the adaptability of the manufacturing industry. This recruiting practice, through 
adjusting economic incentives and obscuring labor contracts, enables the market to 
relocate workers into different factories as production requires, thereby redistributing the 
total workforce under labor shortage. While workers consent to these arrangements 
because of high economic rewards, they also highlight doing temporary jobs as 
exercising control over their labor power, a strategic tool to detach themselves from the 
rigorous factory regime. 
	 i	



























 LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Labor Price Comparison Between Full-time Worker and 
Temporary Dispatch Worker 
  
	 iii	
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. China Total Export by Months: 1995-2020 (in billion USD) 
Figure 2. Weekly Fluctuation of Return Bonus: August-December 2019 
(in hundred RMB) 





I would first like to express my gratitude to my academic advisor Sarah Babb for the 
inspiring comments, remarks and engagement in the writing process of this master thesis. 
Her passionate participation and encouraging words have enabled me to stay on track 
when doing the research. I would also want to thank Professor Charles Derber for serving 
on my thesis committee. He has provided many useful suggestions on how to develop 
this study in the future. Furthermore, I want to deliver my sincerest appreciation to the 
workers who are willing to share their experience with me. It is their life story that 
inspired me to conduct this study and it is their struggle that I wanted to address to larger 
audience. 
This thesis is not only a short-term outcome, but a continuing progress that involves 
the knowledge and skills I have learnt in my graduate study. Therefore, I would like to 
thank all the professors who have taught me in the past two years: Natasha Sarkisian, 
Wen Fan, Julia Chuang, Eve Spangler, Stephen Pfohl, Andrew Jorgenson, and Laura 
Nelson. It is their teaching effort that provided the solid foundation for the research. 
Finally, to my loved family, who have supported me both emotionally and financially 
throughout the entire graduate school, I want to share my best wishes to them.
	 1	
1.    INTRODUCTION 
Since its market reform and opening-up policy in 1978, China has achieved 
remarkable economic performance in the past four decades. Notably, this transition to 
market economy was characterized by two general trends. First, similar to the history of 
other developing and developed countries, China has experienced rapid structural reform 
featuring a steady flow of surplus labor from agriculture to industry and from rural to 
urban areas. Secondly, China has gradually transformed from a planned economy with a 
strict allocation of labor in the state sectors to an open market with free mobility of labor 
in the private sectors. Both of these trends have introduced a significant amount of labor 
force to the urban labor market, resulting in a pool of unlimited cheap labor that has 
attracted direct foreign investment and made China’s labor-intensive industries possible.  
Nevertheless, the unlimited labor supply cannot last forever. Since 2004, migrant 
labor shortages have appeared in the Pearl River Delta and the Yangtze River Delta 
where manufacturing industries are densely located. According to the Chinese National 
Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the number of manufacturing workers has continuously 
decreased since 2008 and the remaining workforce in 2019 is about 30% less from that of 
ten years ago (NBS 2019). Chinese manufacturing wages have also risen sharply with 
globalization. Average real wages have doubled in the six years from 2001 to 2007 after 
China entered WTO (Yang et al. 2010). More recently, after the 2008 economic crisis, 
	 2	
the annual wage for manufacturing workers has tripled from 26,810 RMB in 2009 to 
72,088 RMB in 2018. Comparisons of international data also suggest that China’s unit 
labor costs have already surpassed India Malaysia, Philippines and other emerging Asian 
emerging markets, gradually losing its competitiveness in labor costs (Yang 2010; Cui et 
al. 2018). 
Anxiety over rising labor cost has raised heated discussions on whether China will 
reach a “Lewisian turning point”, where rural surplus labor is depleted to such a level that 
continuing industrialization cannot be supported cheaply. Scholars have argued that 
because of the changes in demographical pattern and the improvements in human capital, 
the benefit of unlimited labor supply is vanishing after a long-term development of the 
dual economy (Cai & Zhao 2008; Li et al. 2012; Ge & Yang 2011). Conversely, by 
examining the marginal productivity of labor and the relationship between supply and 
demand, some argue that a substantial amount of surplus labor in China’s agricultural 
sector continues to exist (Minami & Ma 2010; Golley & Meng 2011). Similarly, Knight 
et al. (2011) argue that the phenomenon of labor shortage in urban areas could exist 
simultaneously with substantial surplus labor in rural areas. This is because of the 
discriminating household registration system that has served as a structural obstacle to the 
free flow of labor from rural to urban areas (Meng 2012). In a different perspective, due 
to the release of Labor Contract Law in 2008 and several regulations on minimum wage 
and social welfare in recent years, some have suggested that the rise of labor price is a 
Polynesian countermovement to the ever-degrading working conditions of Chinese 
workers (Meng & Li 2013). Overall, these authors have observed that there will not be a 
clear Lewisian turning point because of China’s unique economic and political structures, 
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but they do acknowledge that China is entering a new stage of development with limited 
labor supply. 
The above-mentioned studies, however, are mostly built on economic models of 
labor supply and demand, where population structure, fertility rate, educational patterns, 
and labor skills are highlighted as factors influencing the supply side of this relationship. 
Despite that few studies have considered the social and political structures where these 
economical models are embedded, neither of these groups has addressed the issue that in 
such a rigorous labor supply condition, how do the labor-intense industries manage to 
work around with the situation and maintain their production? As official NBS data on 
manufacturing PMI shows, the average PMI from 2010 to 2019 is still above 50, 
suggesting that the Chinese manufacture industry is still expending at a normal pace 
(NBS 2020). Such growth of China’s manufacturing share in the global economy 
suggests that there still exists a tension to be explained between the structural labor 
shortage and the continuously operating world factory. 
While previous studies have focused on the self-contained shop floor to explain how 
the factory regime can control labor costs and workers effectively, this study seeks to 
introduce labor market intermediaries, mainly dispatch labor agency and temporary 
agency workers, into the discussion. The paper begins by reviewing the literature on the 
changes in Chinese labor control from despotic factory regimes to the use of flexible 
employment. It points out the importance of labor intermediaries in managing workers 
and establishing nonstandard employment relationships. I argue that in order to reduce 
labor costs, a flexible hiring system based on seasonal production has been established by 
labor staffing agencies to facilitate Chinese manufacturing. This recruiting practice, 
	 4	
through adjusting economic incentives and work durations, enables the market to relocate 
workers into different factories as production requires, thereby redistributing the total 
workforce under labor shortage. 
The findings are divided into three sections. The first section discusses the impact of 
global consumption demand on China’s manufacturing, which generates the need of 
using temporary labor and the system of flexible recruitment. The second section is 
devoted to the key elements of such a system: the flexibility in work duration and labor 
price components that reacts to seasonal production and the ambiguous labor contracts 
that have covered these arrangements from supervision. Apart from the macro and meso-
level, the third section answers why workers consent to this flexible system. While 
workers are tempted to temporary labor because of its high economic incentives, intervals 
between temporary jobs can provide a periodical escape from factory work. In addition, 
workers highlight doing temporary work as exercising control over their labor power, a 
strategic tool to detach themselves from the rigorous factory regime. 
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2.    LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1    MANAGING CHINA’S PRODUCTION: FROM DESPOTIC REGIME TO 
FLEXIBLE EMPLOYMENT 
Questions regarding how China’s “World Factory” operates effectively and 
continuously has attracted the attention of researchers at home and abroad. Early studies 
based on theories of labor process and factory regime have explored the dominance in 
micro-production scenarios and ways to reduce labor costs (Chan & Zhu 2003; Chan 
1995; Zhang 2008). Practices of despotic management such as control over workers’ 
body, restricting personal time, withholding necessary documents, deducting wages and 
corporal punishment have prevailed in both export processing enterprises and the 
transforming SOEs. Localist networks, kinship and family ties were cooperated into the 
factory regime to mediate the supply of labor and provide means for maintaining workers’ 
livelihood, which reduced management's financial burden, legitimized managerial control 
and weakened the antagonism between labor and capital (Lee 1995). Gender identity is 
also exploited as well. Female workers are constructed as “working girls” with few 
experiences, lacking career aspirations and learning motivation, so they are naturally 
placed in low-wage, low-skilled front-line production positions (Lee 1995; Pun 2005). 
Literature also found spatial reconfigurations of production, daily reproduction and social 
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reproduction through Hukou system and dormitory system (Pun & Smith 2007; Ren & 
Pun 2006; Swider 2015). On one hand, workers’ access to social services, welfare, and 
children’s education are located at their hometowns so as to shift social reproductive 
costs from urban employers to rural villages (Shen 2006). On the other hand, workers’ 
production and their daily lives are merged under the dormitory regime, in which dozens 
of workers are crammed into single dormitory room in order to eliminate the need for 
transportation and to facilitate flexible production arrangements (Ren & Pun 2006). 
Most of these migrant labor studies in the 2000s, however, are field studies that look 
only at management culture, work process, employ structure, and living spaces in a single 
factory, in which economic environment, labor market changes and hiring practices 
outside the workplace are seldom mentioned (Wang 2018). Such studies also overlooked 
how labor conditions and employment practices are influenced by the global supply chain 
and regional competition in Asia-Pacific (Shen & Wen 2014). As researchers noticed, 
few significant changes have already taken place in the current manufacturing 
environment in China. Firstly, as the geographies of production stretched across national 
boundaries, the profit of OEM (original equipment manufacturer) industry has further 
reduced due to increasing competitors in Southeast Asia (Cui & Lu 2018; Zhang et al. 
2015; Yang 2016). Secondly, not only have supply chains covered greater geographic 
scope, lead times also become shorter to respond to oscillations in consumer demand, 
forcing capitalism to take more flexible ways of production and organization (Gereffi 
2005). Thirdly, the abundant supply of docile and hard-working migrant workers in the 
early days have vanished. Young people have escaped from the manufacturing industry, 
intensifying the issue of labor shortage (NBS 2019). Fourthly, the early alliance between 
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local governments and labor-intensive enterprises based on extensive economic growth is 
gradually replaced. Some local governments have promoted the upgrading and 
transformation of labor-intensive industries by strictly implementing labor regulations, 
tacitly approving labor movement, and subtly advocating labor law awareness (Wang 
2017).  
The profound changes in the labor market and the rising awareness of workers’ 
rights and interests force capital to take back its despotic faces and to implement more 
flexible ways to reduce labor costs. A key feature contributing to this trend is the 
deregulation of the labor market and the dramatic growth in the use of informal 
employment in the form of self-employment, temporary work, hourly rate work, labor 
dispatching labor, and labor outsourcing (Cooke 2011; Zhou 2012; Wang 2016). In this 
context, several studies explored different ways of informal and nonstandard employment 
to accommodate the flexible accumulation of capital. Huang (2012) has analyzed the 
impact of the global order market’s high instability on creating a group of temporary 
workers, who specialize in urgent orders to help factories accomplish their overloaded 
tasks on time. Ren and Zhang (2015) focused on how child labor is deeply involved in 
the subcontracting chain of global production, in which rural left-behind children 
supported the system of labor reproduction by engaging in housework and agricultural 
production, which eventually obscured the boundary between production and social 
reproduction and reduced the reproductive cost of capitalism. A group of studies has also 
recorded the prevalence of dispatch workers, contract workers, and outsourced workers in 
manufacturing industries, in which workers are subcontracted to factories from temporary 
staffing agencies to reduce factories’ management expenditure, welfare cost, and 
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employer liabilities (Chang 2009; Zhang 2008, 2014; So 2014; Feng 2019; Swider 2015). 
Other studies have analyzed how students in vocational schools are turned into unpaid 
workers under the name of internship, thereby creating an ambiguous relationship 
between education and work (Su 2011; Pun & Koo 2015; Chan et al. 2015). 
These studies have grasped the profound change in the labor market and 
demonstrated the diverse employment practices under the flexible system of global 
production. However, what has been missing here is the intermediary point between 
workers and factories. As Mears (2015) has argued, the organization of work is not 
necessarily bound to the shop floor. For the growing numbers of informal and 
nonstandard workers, social ties with brokers rather than managers at the workplace are 
at the heart of relations of production (Mears 2015; Venkatesh 2006). Therefore, by 
centering around worker’s experience and identity at production, most of the previous 
studies have overlooked the organizational forces that relocate workers into contingent, 
part-time and temporary jobs. In today’s Chinese labor market, the supply of migrant 
laborers has been institutionalized and monopolized by all kinds of labor intermediary 
agencies and contract agencies. As the Shanghai Federation of Trade Union reports, 
agency employment has grown 36.1% between 2006 and 2011 in China. An estimated 60 
million urban employees in China were labor dispatch employees, making up nearly 17% 
of the total workforce in urban employment (NBS 2014). The systemic usage of dispatch 
labor in Chinese industries indicates that staffing agencies are precisely the 
organizational force for hiring and managing workers, which has become an important 
basis for establishing informal and nonstandard employment relations. Hence, instead of 
focusing on the politics of production at workplace, more attention needs to be paid to the 
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intermediating power of labor market agencies. By taking dispatch labor—the largest 
type of China’s flexible employment practice— as the case, this study looks into the 
hiring process of labor dispatch agencies to explore how labor organizations mediate 
between market fluctuation and labor supply to maintain the operation of China’s 
factories. 
2.2    FLEXIBLE WORK, INTERMEDIARY AGENCY AND CHINA’S 
DISPATCH LABOR 
Interest in flexible work system has grown in past decades as global competition and 
capitalist expansion dissolves the stable “Fordist” mass-production and the standard 
employment relationship around the world. A growing body of social science literature 
has since examined the organizational and technological innovations as well as the social-
relational changes comprising new flexible forms of work. Following Wood (1992), 
researchers have summarized two elements of flexibility found in a variety of 
occupational and industrial settings (Hunter et al. 1993; Smith 1997; Kalleberg 2001). 
The first being termed as “functional flexibility" that characterizes a new management 
and organizational mechanism in the workflow, including self-managed teams, inventory 
reformation, new technology, job expansion and rotation, and quality circles (Smith 
1997). The second element, the so-called “numerical flexibility”, refers to the ascent of 
part-time jobs and contingent workers and to the decline of the permanent employment 
model (Vosko 2010; Kalleberg 2000). Because the former enables employees to 
participate in decision-making and enhance their skillset to redeployed in a variety of 
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jobs, some researchers also frame the former as internal flexibility, while the latter as 
external flexibility because it uses external workforces to manage fluctuations in 
workload and to reduce labor cost (Cappelli & Neumark 2001; Abraham 1990). 
The pursuit to organizational flexibility, especially to numerical and external 
flexibility, led to a growing trend in the use of flexible staffing arrangement—such as 
part-time, fixed-term contract, contingent, dispatch, and outsourced work— and workers 
are often provided by temporary labor staffing agencies (Houseman 1997; Kalleberg 
2000; Houseman 2001; Arnold & Bongiovi 2013). Types of those staffing agencies may 
vary between different forms of flexible employment, but in general, staffing agencies 
recruit, screen, hire, and (possibly) train individuals and assign them to client 
organizations, while the user company claims the supervisory role of the workers 
(International Labor Organization (ILO) 1997). These agencies mediate between 
individual workers and enterprises, shaping the recruitment process, employee training, 
performance of tasks, management at workplaces, and how conflicts are resolved (Autor 
2009; Hatton 2010; Bonet & Cappeli 2013). By doing so, temporary staffing agencies 
also changed the bilateral, employee-employer relationship into a three-way “triangular” 
relationship, complicating legal responsibilities when disputes arise (Gonos 1997). 
Because of the important role of temporary work agency in structuring the labor market, 
a number of studies around the world have hence, recorded its influence on various 
employment outcomes such as wage differentials, working condition, skill and career 
development, occupational safety (Jahn & Pozzoli 2013; Forde & Slater 2005; Kvasnicka 
2009; Broschak & Davis-Blake 2006; Rubery et al. 2004; Benner et al. 2007; Autor & 
Houseman 2010). Other researches have also analyzed its impact on implementing “core-
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periphery” models of organizations (Hatton 2011; Cappelli & Neumark 2004; Houseman 
et al. 2003); eroding union formation and workers right (Hatton 2014), and how it enables 
employers to circumvent their liabilities and obligations (Mitlacher 2007; Autor 2001; 
Huang 2017). 
Although fruitful and insightful as they are, previous studies are mainly derived 
from well-developed countries and have centered around industries such as financial 
services, information technologies, government, entertainment, and health, in which 
professionals, clerks, nurses, and other white-color occupations are needed (Bonet & 
Cappeli 2013). At the end of the global commodity chain, however, manufacturing 
industry in developing countries raises significantly different requirements for labor 
staffing agencies. First, labor-intensive manufacturing requires abundant low-skill 
workers at an immense level. Instead of staffing a few people to different companies, 
manufacturing staffing agencies needs the ability to search, screen, and training 
thousands of workers for a single enterprise. How labor staffing agencies relocate 
immense labors in a short period of time is the key to understanding the operation of 
OEM factories. Secondly, in the buyer-dominant global commodity chain, manufacturers 
are often faced with production and lead time change due to intensive order fluctuation 
from consumer demand (Gereffi & Korzeeniewicz 1994). This requires an elastic 
mechanism that allows swift shifting in personnel change to maximize numerical 
flexibility. In other words, an ability to reduce or increase employment or wage levels 
with ease according to production needs. Thirdly, because of the differences in social 
context, how labor staffing institutions are embedded in the historical and political 
background of the local labor market requires specific consideration. 
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In the case of China, “Labor dispatch,” “temporary staffing,” or “human resources 
outsourcing” are some of the names used to describe the increasing human resource 
practice in the Chinese labor market. Labor dispatch as a triangular form of employment 
relationship was first used in representative offices of foreign companies in the early 
1980s when China began its opening up to the global market (Xu 2008). The prosperity 
of labor dispatch did not happen until mid-1990s when widespread redundancies in 
China’s state-owned and collectively owned enterprises created a large amount of 
unemployment. Labor dispatch, in this context, served as a complementary practice for 
the government to solve employment issues among lay off workers and helped to build a 
flexible labor market for further economic reform (Xu 2008; Liu 2014). In the early 
2000s, due to degrading labor conditions and rising labor unrest, the state released a new 
Labor Contract Law (LCL) in 2008 to safeguard workers' rights and welfare, which 
eventually increased labor cost for manufacturers. In response to this, many enterprises 
begin using agency workers on a long-term basis to avoid compliance with the tightened 
labor legislation in the wake of rising wages. Labor dispatch has since met the need for 
cost-cutting and production flexibility in various enterprises. (Cooke 2011; Feng 2019). 
Studies on Chinese labor dispatch agencies have explained the complex developing 
process of this industry involving multiple actors and their needs at different time stages. 
Many studies have also analyzed the interaction between factory and labor agencies, its 
institutional effects on labor relations, workers' conditions, and the legal problems that 
arose from it (Cooke 2011; Tian 2014; So 2014; Huang 2017; Feng 2019). However, 
there are several missing pieces that are seldomly addressed. First, what are the concrete 
organizational forces and techniques through which these agencies mobilize, recruit, and 
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relocate an immense amount of workers to enter the production field? Secondly, how 
does the labor staffing agencies stimulate young workers into a temporary job that is 
known for harming workers right and career development? And finally, why do workers 
consent to become the mobile labor forces deployed by labor agencies? As a number of 
studies have shown, the second generation of Chinese migrant workers has grown 
increasingly tired of factory. They are notable for their increased mobilization, right 
consciousness, and the willingness to change (Zhang 2015; Gallagher 2014; Pun & Lu 
2010; Chen & Tang 2013). Therefore, their acquiescence to the labor staffing agencies’ 
regime remains a puzzle. Based on these considerations, this study takes on the 
intermediary point between workers and factories—the recruitment process of labor 
dispatch agencies—to explore the structure of this labor supply system and strategies of 
how labor agencies allocate workforces under market fluctuation. 
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3.    METHODOLOGY 
This project is based on a two-month field study conducted at Chedun town, located 
in Songjiang District, Shanghai. As a major industrial area in Shanghai, the district was 
once dominated by an export-oriented industry, highly dependent on international 
markets and export trade. In 2007, Songjiang’s total import and export volume accounted 
for 32% of the country's export processing zones. Although recent years saw significant 
improvement in its industrial structure, the OEM industry and low-skill production still 
occupy a significant proportion of its industrial output. Within this background, Chedun 
is also highly dependent on manufacturing industries. The secondary sector has occupied 
60 percent of its economic structure in 2019. But the main reason that makes Chedun an 
ideal place for this study is because of its geographical location. Situated between one 
national highway and two expressways, Chedun is the intersectional point that connects 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Shanghai, the major area of the Yangtze River Delta economic 
zone. Due to its relatively lower living expenses, Chedun has become one of the few 
gathering places for migrant workers. In 2020, the population ratio for local to migrants 
has even reached 5:1. Because of its convenient location, a casual labor market has been 
formed at the center of the town. Within a mile’s range, a little more than 20 labor 
intermediary agencies have crowded on the three main streets of Chedun, providing labor 
forces for the surrounding manufacturing zones.  
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The data for this research consists of two-part. First, observational data and short 
interviews are collected during a two-month ethnography from June to August in 2019. 
My main observation site is at the ZJ agency and the LD agency, two of the largest labor 
intermediaries in the town. For each day at each agency, approximately 300 new workers 
from around the country come for job searching. Workers often signed their contracts on 
their arrival day and were transferred to factories immediately. This quick transition of 
human labor provides an ideal place for studying the structure of the recruiting system at 
the end of the global production chain. My data, thus, includes observing the recruiting 
process at the two agencies and also conversions with labor agents and migrant workers. 
Besides, because Chedun is located in the suburbs of Shanghai, for transportation issues, 
I have shared daily rentals at night with migrant workers in the two main neighborhoods. 
This allows me to have a closer conversation with young migrants about their working 
experiences. 
The second type of data is the digital records of changing labor prices for temporary 
workers, which are collected from ZJ dispatch agencies. These data are recorded in two 
production seasons: in the normal season from August to December 2019 and in the 
exceptional season from February to April 2020 that has been affected by the global 
pandemic of COVID-19. A comparison between the two seasons shows how market 
fluctuation influences the recruitment of labor forces. Because labor prices and job 
positions do not change significantly in the adjacent day, for each week, I have collected 
two or three days of labor prices and averaged them into weekly labor prices. In sum, a 
total of more than 4,000 lists of labor price are collected and graphed for the analysis. 
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4.    SEASONAL PRODUCTION AND THE NEED FOR TEMPORARY 
WORKERS 
Chen is a 23-year-old worker from Henan province and has worked in Shanghai for 
the past two years. Normally, he moved between factories for temporary jobs, with each 
working period lasting several months. Once in a while, however, he would drop out of 
the factory job and works as a day laborer in the surrounding areas. Strangely as he seems 
to be wandering between temporary employment and unemployment, he said: “There is 
barely any long term and full-time jobs available here. Although I wouldn’t go if there’s 
any.”1 Chen’s experience was not the only case at Chedun. Temporary openings occupy 
over eighty percent of the total jobs listed on ZJ’s labor price sheets, while LD agency is 
almost always recruiting day laborers on regular basis. This form of hiring practices have 
its deeper root in the use of core-peripheral mode of production in export industries to 
suit oversea demand and production changes. In this section, I discuss the market force of 
global production that leads to the flexible recruiting system in China’s labor dispatch 
practice. 
In global commodity chains, labor-intensive (as a comparison to technology-
intensive) and consumer-goods industries are mostly buyer-driven, in which large 




production networks in a variety of exporting countries, typically located in the third 
world. Changes in the structure and sales demand of these retailers, therefore, can heavily 
influence the production mode of their outsourcing manufactures. Perhaps the most 
influential factor is the seasonal variation in the demand for consumer products. A wide 
variety of recurring events such as holidays and weather can determine the high and low 
sales of a product. Apparel markets often flourish at the beginning of each season when 
new styles are released. Sales of jewelry, toys, and consumer electronics are high in the 
month before Thanksgiving and Christmas. Every year retailers offer school supply kits 
at the end of summer. Accordingly, seasonality also become the key characteristic in the 
production of these goods. Manufacturers have to produce these products on time and 
deliver to retailers based on their demands.  
As a major part of the global supply chain, China’s manufacturing production is 
deeply embedded in this seasonal variation, and because of its link to oversea demands, 
seasonality is often predictable and can be observed as a routine fluctuation in China’s 
export flow. Figure 1. present China’s monthly export in the recent two decades. 
According to World Bank, manufacturing export has constituted more than 90% of 
China’s export since 2002, which makes export data a reasonable proxy to present how 





A clear trend from the graph is that, as China integrated deeper to the world 
economy, seasonal fluctuation becomes much more intense. Before China entered WTO 
in 2001, export remains still with only small undulation. From 2001 on, export curve, as 
well as seasonal variation, grow significantly. After 2008 when global economic crisis 
hits the market, a distinct contrast can be observed at the turn of each year. Export 
remains fairly stable between May and November with small fluctuations. Beginning 
from November, however, manufacturing exports almost always rises. It soars to its peak 
at December, then falling quickly in January and finally reaching to the bottom in 
February. This gap can be twice large between peak and low seasons.  
The uneven pattern in export demand places a huge challenge to many manufactures. 
The sharp contrast between high and low season indicated that much more than usual 
amount of workforce is needed prior to this export period. In order to fulfill the high 




full capacity and employ enough workers to operate the machine, assemble the parts and 
package the finished products. This maximized productivity, however, soon become 
redundant when demands become low in December, and the labors needed in busy 
seasons will eventually become unnecessary. Thus, a dilemma is created from the 
seasonal demand. On one hand, hiring normal number of full-time workers throughout 
the year would not have the capacity to meet the required productivity in peak seasons 
nor be able to compete against other manufacturers. On the other hand, over-hiring full-
time workers to meet high season demand can become a huge burden when the market 
demand is scarce.  
At the site of a recruitment event, Mr. Wen, an agent in the ZJ labor agency, 
explained to me how high the labor cost could be. Normally, a long-term, full-time, and 
legally contracted factory workers can earn around 4500 RMB (640 USD) per month. 
The wage is made up of four portions: 1) the basic wage calculated by hourly wage 
multiplied by working hours, 2) overtime fees 3) full attendance bonus, and 4) subsidies 
for dining, transportation or wearing antistatic clothing.3 Factories also have to pay 
wuxian yijin, that is, six kinds of social insurance for healthcare, retirement, occupational 
injuries, unemployment, maternity, and the housing fund. Suppose a factory hires 100 
workers, he says, when added up, the compulsory expenditure on wage is about 6 million 
RMB. But not all these workers are needed for the whole year. Nearly half of the them 
are not necessary for months beside August, September, October, and November. In this 
sense, approximately 30 to 40 per cent or even more of the workforce and related labor 




The high labor cost created from seasonal fluctuation and the overall labor shortage 
in manufacturing industry would not be a problem as long as workforces can be 
redistributed according to production needs. On one hand, if redundant workers in each 
factory can be dismissed after peak production, then much more workforces can be 
released from full-time employment, thereby increasing the total labor supply in the labor 
market. On the other hand, if dismissed workers can find jobs in other places, for 
example, a different factory that follows a different seasonal fluctuation, then the overall 
labor force demand at one time point can be reduced. 
A system of this kind, however, would definitely be at the cost of worker’s interest 
due to related issues in social welfare, unemployment, and career development, pushing 
them forward into a more precarious situation. In fact, the 2008 Labor Contract Law has 
already strictly regulated the informal employment market since its release. It required all 
employers to have written contracts for all employees; mass layoff needs to be revised 
and vetted by a local labor inspector from an official labor bureau. Because of the 
tightened regulation, firing full-time employees can result in serious legal consequences 
as well as downplaying enterprises’ reputation. However, while full-time workers have 
been protected, regulations regarding temporary and dispatched labors are limited, which 
left loopholes for the market to take advantage of. In response to the seasonal production 
and labor law restriction, a flexible hiring system is developed based on the dispatch 
labor relationship, the solution is that factories now maintain only a limited amount of 
full-time employee for normal production and to hire temporary agency workers through 
labor dispatch agencies when orders are high in peak seasons. In the flowing sections, I 
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5.    LABOR DISPATCH AND THE SYSTEM OF FLEXIBLE RECRUITMENT 
5.1    FLEXIBILITY IN WORKING DURATION 
As Chen has experienced, job placement of full-time workers seldom appears at the 
labor market in Chedun. Instead, they are often hired directly by the factory, either by 
hiring high skilled workers on the market, from vocational schools or promoting potential 
temporary workers. The hiring of temporary labor is entrusted to dispatch labor agencies; 
hence they are also called the agency workers or dispatch workers. These workers 
conduct what are seen as routine and mechanical activities on the assembly line, 
performing tasks such as assembling, machine operation, quality check, packaging, and 
labeling, which require very few skills. In fact, it is manpower rather than skills and 
working experience that the labor market is looking for. A few days of job training 
provided by the labor agencies would easily qualify workers to be eligible. Hence, the 
only requirements for most jobs at the labor market in Chedun are aged 16-40, with 
middle school education, and can write A-Z from memory.  
During the hiring process of temporary workers, a business contract relationship is 
established between the dispatch agencies and its client firms, in which labor forces are 
sold and bought as a form of commodity. Workforces are provided by agencies, and the 
numbers needed are set according to the recruitment plan of customer firms. Depending 
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on the urgency of production needs, recruitment plan can be divided into normal plans 
and emergency plans. 
Normal recruitment plans are made ahead of each season. Because order fluctuation 
can be predicted and large orders are often received in advance, factories are able to 
forecast how many numbers of workforce and how much total expenditure are needed 
based on past experience. These plans are then passed on to their dispatch agency 
partners so that the later could start the hiring process and deliver enough temporary 
workers on time. Working period under this type of recruitment are usually around 60 
days, 45 days, and 30 days, adjustable depending on the production needs. Although 
production can last as long as three or four months, due to shortened lead times and 
increased production speed, however, most of the working periods are compressed into 
these three modes. Because recruitment plans are made ahead, labor agencies have 
sufficient amount of time to search for potential workers. Recruitment information are 
spread both online (at Wechat) and offline (at surrounding areas) to reach for a larger 
labor supply pool, so that workers from both local areas and other provinces can contact 
the agencies.  
Factories may also have unplanned tasks due to either sudden increase of orders or 
errors in the predictability of ready-made plan. When this happens, the reserved 
workforce might not be able to handle the extra number of tasks and new workers are 
required. Working period in this type of hiring practices can last from less a week to half 
a month to suit small oscillation in the market. Because of its supplementary role, the 
positions are fewer than those of long working period, but usually offer a high wage.  
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Offline recruitment is preferred in this case because of its timeliness. As mentioned 
in the previous section, Chedun has been an important gate to many migrant workers who 
seek jobs in the industrial zones surrounding Shanghai. Workers can be easily found in 
several clustering places. During my stay at Chedun, I have observed occasions when 
agents from different labor agencies searching for workers in resident estates, on the 
streets, and at the town squares. Offline recruitment can be very expeditious. In some 
cases when orders are pressing, labor agencies can drive several buses of workers 
overnight to the factory when the firms contacted one day before. 
The two types of hiring practices of temporary worker forms a complementary role 
with each other in the production system. For factories, the main production tasks are 
completed by the planned recruitment workforces. But in case of any emergencies, 
auxiliary workforces can be easily transferred to the site. For workers, longer working 
period enables them to save money for themselves and sending remittance to their 
hometown, while short-termed day-works provide a transition between two factory jobs, 
safeguarding their daily reproduction in the city.  
5.2    FLEXIBILITY IN LABOR PRICE ARRANGEMENTS 
5.2.1    The general arrangement 
Wage price for day labors are usually are high, roughly 220-300 RMB per day or 
25-28 RMB per hour, comparing to 12-13 RMB per hour for full-time jobs. Food and 
temporary shelters are covered, and their wages are mostly paid at the end of the day. The 
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labor price for the longer temporary workers, however, contains a whole different system, 
which involves economic incentives that stimulates them to engage in seasonal jobs than 
looking for secure full-time positions. These incentives usually far surpass the normal 
wages a full-time worker could earn, especially during months of peak seasons, which 
can be as twice as many in some factories. On the basis of the aforementioned monthly 
wage calculation, factory recruitment process generated different variations for 
distributing these incentives. One of the ways is to raise hourly wages so that the basic 
wage is much higher than full-time workers. But the most common practices have been 
given out one-time “Return Bonus” (Fanfei), a strategy developed in the context of 
seasonal production, which has become a universal incentive for current labor dispatch 
agencies to attract workers to return to factories. Thus came the name “Return”. 
 
 
Table 1.	Labor Price Comparison Between Full-time and Temporary Worker. 4 
 
Table 1. shows the comparison of labor price composition between a full-time 




worker performing the same job as his/her full-time peers receive the same amount of 
wage, subsidies, and overtime fees, which is stated by a protective regulation termed 
“equal job equal pay” (Tonggong Tongchou) in the Labor Contract Law. But in order to 
attract workers during high production seasons, labor agencies send out extra bonuses in 
addition to their formal wages.5 Specifically, temporary workers first receive the same 
amount of basic monthly wages as normal workers do at payday. Then, on the basis of 
this basic salary, temporary workers receive an extra bonus at end of their whole working 
period. Depending on the production need, this can be either three-month, two-month, or 
one-month. These incentives usually far surpass the normal wages a full-time worker 
could earn, stimulating workers into temporary jobs. For example, on the September 1st 
labor price sheet at ZJ agency, Foxconn, the world's largest provider of electronics 
manufacturing services, offers a return bonus of 11000 RMB after 55 days of work at its 
branch in Jiashan, a county adjacent to Shanghai. The agency will drive interested 
workers to Jiashan from its office at Chedun and offers an additional 500 RMB for 
factory entry bonus once they are qualified at the interview. Thus, the workers will 
receive a total of 11500RMB in addition to their basic wages and subsidies, which is 
much higher than what a normal full-time employee could earn in two months.  
However, this kind of labor price arrangement is not meant for the benefit of 
workers. A comparison of annual cost suggests that factories reduce much more on their 
total labor expenditure for hiring temporary than full-time employees. For each worker, 
factory reduce at least one third of their annual labor cost if the employee is hired 





working period, they have to keep looking for high return bonus among different 
factories, increasing their risk of being unemployed. In addition, to receive the bonus, 
several criteria have to be met. First, workers cannot take any leaves of absence during 
their working period. This means that they have to work many consecutive days, 
sometimes two months, without rest. Secondly, because return bonuses are paid by the 
dispatch companies, to ensure whether a worker is eligible for the return bonus, they ask 
factories for a name list of qualified workers based on the number of days workers 
clocked in and whether they had any disciplinary violations. However, it takes time to 
make such a list. Workers usually have to work for another one or two months in the 
factory until the name list is sent to dispatch agencies. Thirdly, once the name roll is sent 
out, workers need to go through a proper resignation process that indicates their 
willingness to resign. This eventually disassociates agencies and factories from any legal 
responsibility since it is the workers who are voluntarily relinquishing their jobs rather 
than being laid off by their employers.  
A detailed examination into the source of return bonus also suggests that this system 
operates at the cost of workers’ welfare. According to the agents, “Fanfei” comes from 
the human resource commissions that they received from client firms. These 
commissions include the remuneration for helping to find, interview, and deliver 
workforces; for managing workers during their stay in the factory; and for resolving labor 
disputes. In order to achieve recruitment goals during labor shortage, dispatch agencies 
would take out part of these payments as return bonuses to attract workers.  
However, conversations with experienced workers reveal the other side of the 
picture. A large part of the economic incentives actually originates from workers’ own 
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social insurance that dispatch agencies are responsible to pay to the social security bureau. 
In theory, the 2013 amendments on dispatch labor state that it is mandatory for employers 
to make monthly contributions to employees’ social insurance, covering pensions, 
medical, work injury, maternity, and unemployment, regardless of whether they are 
regular full-time factory workers or dispatch workers. In practice, however, few agencies 
make a full contribution of all the five components. It is common to purchase only one 
type of insurances or simply purchase business insurance but claim that they have bought 
full social security for the workers. If the employee does not check their social security 
record, they may not know what type of insurance the employer has paid for them. In 
other occasions, because dispatch workers have three months of probation, dispatch 
agencies tacitly consent that no social security should be paid during this period and 
naturally embezzled the social security, which again becomes the source of return bonus. 
In other words, the reason why temporary workers can receive high labor prices in a short 
period of time is often at the expense of their future social insurance. Ironically, workers 
have taken their deserved benefits as a reward. 
 
5.2.2    The fluctuation of return bonuses 
The system of return bonus is developed to suit sessional production. Hence the 
amount of return bonuses is also subject to the rule of seasonal production. During high 
seasons, agencies offer higher return bonus to compete with others for the scarce labor 
and to hire as quickly as possible to keep up with production. In seasons when demands 
are low and productions are mostly complete, factories reduce economic incentives and 
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numbers of hiring to maintain minimal function. For example, At the end of November, 
the same Foxconn factory at Jiashan, reduced its return bonus from 111000 RMB for 55 
days to 3000 RMB for 45 days. Although the labor price is still higher than a full-time 
worker could earn, this amount of premium does not seem very attractive to temporary 
workers given that dispatch workers tends to receive more management abuse than 
normal workers.  
 
 
Figure 2. Weekly fluctuation of return bonus: August-December 2019, in hundred RMB.6 
 
Figure 2. presents the average weekly fluctuation of return bonus (“Fanfei”) based 
on 2,000 records of job listed at ZJ agency between August and November. As the figure 
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and remains above 6,000 RMB until October, which correspond to the high demand of 
production in August, September, and early October. However, since export is always at 
the bottom in December, few production and hiring are needed in the months before 
December. Accordingly, the whole month of October saw a sharp decrease of return 
bonus from 6,000 RMB to 4,000 RMB, indicating the end of production season.  
The structure of return bonuses in different working periods also reflect the hiring 
flexibility according to production need. After the first week of September, the “fanfei” 
for two-month mode begin to decline, but at the same time, the bonus for the 45 days 
working period begin to increase. The time point is right about two months before 
production season ends in November, which suggests that factories now need fewer 
workers to work for the longer period (two-month period). Instead, they need workers to 
cover a shorter period of their remaining production plan. Thus, it is noticeable that the 
highest bonus for 45 days working period is at the first week of October, about 45 days 
before peak season concludes. The curve for one month working period has relatively 
small fluctuation compared to the other two, with relatively stable cycles throughout the 
season. This helps to serve as a supplement to the production system, which enables new 
hiring to fulfill the tasks due to urgent orders. Thus, by leveling the economic incentives 
and the mode of working period, this flexible system allows dispatch agencies to control 
the number of workers under different production needs. For each individual factory, it 
enables the firm to accumulate production when demand peaks and to reduce production 
rates to its basic functionality when the demand is low. For the whole industry, because 
much more labor forces are released from full-time jobs, these workers can then be 
redistributed to different factories, reducing the pressure of labor market supply. 
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5.2.3    The pandemic example 
The COVID-19 pandemic provides a perfect case to examine the flexibility of this 
system under extreme supply-demand conditions. Coronavirus (COVID-19) is an 
infectious disease caused by the acute respiratory syndrome. It was first identified in 
Wuhan, China in December 2019 and has resulted in an ongoing pandemic over the 
world. As of July 2020, more than 13 million cases have been reported across 188 
countries and territories, resulting in more than 500,000 deaths.  
The virus is highly contagious as it primarily spread between people during close 
contact, most often via small droplets produced by coughing, sneezing, and talking. In an 
effort to quarantine the center of the outbreak to prevent the spread, on 23 January 2020, 
China imposed a lockdown in Wuhan and other cities in Hubei province. On Jan 25, 
more than 30 provinces have activated first-level public health emergency response: 
residents are ordered to stay home, schools and workplaces are closed, and traveling is 
highly restricted.  
The quarantine strategies were announced during the Chinese New Year when 
approximately 12.5 million migrant workers were back in their hometown for family 
reunion. The timing is fortunate when people are mostly staying at home on holidays, 
which reduced the chance of widespread disease. However, this also means that most of 
the workforces are stranded in rural areas due to restrictions on travel and large group 
gathering. Compared to 2019, the rate of return for migrants to cities in 2020 has been 80 
percent less than at the same time on Feb 1, which exacerbated the labor shortage 
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situation in the city when the economy and production needed to resume in mid-February 
(Baidu Migration Map 2020). On Feb 6, the State Council announced the gradual 
resumption of work and production on the premise of effective epidemic containment in 
an active and orderly manner. But until mid-Feb, the migration return rate was still about 
30 percent of that figure at the same time in 2019 (Baidu Migration Map 2010, 2020). 
Competitions over limited returning workforces, thus, become essential to providers of 
manufacturing services.  
 
Figure 3. Weekly fluctuation of return bonus: February-June 2020, in hundred RMB.7 
 
At the beginning of February, Foxconn raised the return bonus to 3,000 RMB, and 
soon increased to 5,000 RMB in response to the need for work resumption. But this price 
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two-month working period was already approaching 8,000 RMB, a price that did not 
even appear at the highest point in the peak production season in Fall. At this stage, the 
rush to resume work has a different competitive significance. As a factory manager said 
when interviewed by the newspaper:  
We are all world-class leading manufacturers, so the quality of our products is not 
much different…What really matters is how fast a company can gather enough 
manpower to complete the order. The quicker it gets, the more likely it will receive 
follow-up orders from customers. (Caixin Weekly, 24 February 2020) 
 
Working periods for less than two-month saw very few increases in return bonus 
and were often below the average amount in low production seasons. This was because of 
the backlog of orders from December, January, and early February, which lead to heavy 
production tasks and longer production periods. Adding to the fact of the overall labor 
shortage in the market in February, the longer the factories can keep hold of the 
workforce the better. Hence, return bonuses for a working period of 45 days and one-
month were cut down in order to direct labor supply into a longer production period. 
Return bonus began to slide as work resumption gradually proceeds. Due to the 
effective mobilizing power of a central government, 80% of the migrant workforces have 
returned to the city in mid-March, according to the Ministry of Human and Social Affairs. 
By the end of the month, the electronic industry and iron industry have achieved over 90 
percent work resumption rate; for textile, machinery, and light industry, the rate is 
between 70 to 90 percent (The State Council Information Office. P.R.C. 2020a). 
Correspondingly, the increase of labor supply led to a dramatic reduction in “Fanfei” for 
all three-working periods in the third and fourth weeks of March, which dropped to 
around 2,500 RMB, 1,300 RMB, and 700 RMB respectively, a figure even lower than 
those of November last year. 
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The continuous decrease of return bonus from the end of March to April reflects the 
spread of pandemic over the world, which caused economic turbulence in many countries 
and a decrease in foreign demand for Chinese manufactured goods. China Containerized 
Freight Index (CCFI), the barometer for shipping exports, was declining from February to 
April 2020. Although the Purchase Management Index (PMI) from the National Bureau 
of Statistics has bounced back in March from the historical bottom, it still did not return 
to the normal level. On March 24, the executive meeting of the State Council pointed out 
the first time that “external demand orders are shrinking” in the current context of the 
global economy (The State Council Information Office. P.R.C. 2020b). 
The impact of a contraction in foreign demand is most notable in clothing and 3C 
industries (Computer, Communication, and Consumer Electronics), as those products are 
less essential than anti-epidemic supplies such as masks and mechanical ventilators. A 
sample survey on weaving clusters from the China Textile Industry Association at the 
end of March showed that the orders exported to the European and American markets fell 
by more than 50% (Caixin Weekly, 6 April 2020). Some enterprises have even 
experienced suspension or cancellation on existing orders. The electronic industry suffers 
the same kind of issue, and because it relies more on the supply chain, enterprises 
encountered raw material shortages and price inflation from other countries. On March 
23, Foxconn IDPBG (integrated Digital Product Business Group) at Zhengzhou stopped 
hiring new workers. On April 20, Kunshan United Tao Electronics Corporation, a leading 
electronic company in the Yangtze River Delta, stopped to provide return bonus for 
temporary workers. A dispatch agent at Chedun warned workers about the upcoming 
crisis and to urged them stay in whatever job they could find:  
	 35	
All friends who have not yet found a job or are planning to resign, find a job as 
soon as possible and don’t be picky. As long as they provide food and places to live, 
that’s fine. This is a harsh time, don't underestimate the follow-up calamity brought 
by this epidemic. The global economic depression is on its way, so please be 
prepared for it. Don’t let yourself get into a dead end.8 
 
The harsh time did not continue into May, however. As countries are adapting to the 
pandemic through social distancing and working from home, newly reported cases of 
Covid-19 stagnated for a short period around May (Our World in Data 2020). Especially 
in many developed countries, a decreasing trend in the total confirmed cases has appeared. 
The optimistic situations led countries to reopen their economy, and as a result, Chinese 
manufactures begin to receive more orders compared to previous months. Manufacturing 
exports returned to the level of previous years for the first time in May. This need for 
production leads to more hiring. As Figure 3. shows, the return bonus continued to 
increase until the second week of June when a new round of coronavirus started to 
spread.  
5.3    FLEXIBILITY IN LABOR CONTRACT 
As the case of pandemic indicates, the hiring system through return bonus can 
magnify the flexibility and adaptability of industrial production when faced with market 
turbulence. Yet, this is operated at the cost of workers’ welfare. As described in previous 
sections, although temporary workers earn much higher than full-time workers for each 
working period, in the long run, they would risk themselves in frequent unemployment, 




In order to extend labor protections, several regulations have been introduced since 
the 2010s to restrict dispatch practices, the basis that this hiring system is built on. 
Enterprises are required to lower the proportion of dispatch workers to less than 10% of a 
company’s total workforce; dispatched workers can be used “only” in temporary 
positions (defined as 6 months or less), auxiliary positions and substitute positions; and 
employers must make monthly contributions to employees’ social insurance. A strict 
qualification of agency registration has also been prescribed, increasing the minimum 
registered capital of dispatch agency to 2 million RMB (Cairns 2015). These 
measurements, however, were less effective when carried out onto the ground. As one 
agent said: “There is always a way to get away with it…as long as workers don’t report, 
it is easy to find a solution to the current regulation.”9 In this section, I discuss several 
practices that existed between workers and dispatch agencies and between factories and 
agencies that allowed the system to bypass the legal regulations. 
5.3.1    Between workers and dispatch agencies  
To enable the flexible hiring system to work, the main problem facing dispatch 
agencies is how to transform workers’ social security into return bonuses while avoiding 
legal responsibilities. Apart from purchasing only one social security and taking 
advantage of the probation period, as mentioned in the previous section, dispatch 





First, the return bonus is usually settled outside the formal contract, in an informal 
agreement between agencies and workers, which only states the promised amount of 
bonus, working time arrangement, and names of the two parties involved. It is much 
more like an oral consent written down and bears no legal effect. Because of this 
informality, agencies can disavow the commitment without bearing any legal 
responsibility. Workers have accused some agencies of not giving the promised return 
bonus they supposed to receive after finishing their working period. Yet, due to the 
ambiguity of this agreement, they have no legal tool to claim it back. 
Secondly, instead of the employment relationship that should have been established 
through a labor contract (Laodong Hetong), sometimes agencies would establish a labor-
service relation with workers through a labor-service contract (Laowu Hetong). The 
labor-service relation refers to the economic relations established in the process of 
exchange of equal values on service issues between two equal bodies, while the 
employment relationship is the commonly understood employee-employer relationship in 
which work is provided in exchange for wage and employers has various liabilities to 
their employees. The essential difference is that, in a labor-service relation, there is only 
an economical binding between two equal parties, that is, there is no subordination 
between each other, no administrative affiliation, and no rights or obligations based on 
who’s managing or being managed. It is similar to an ‘independent contractor’ 
relationship in other jurisdictions and is governed by the Civil Code and the Contract 
Law instead of the Labor Contract Law.  
Because labor-service relation is not under the protection of labor contract law, 
social security is also not required. Some dispatch agencies would naturally skimp the 
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social security they owe to the workers and turn them into return bonuses and their 
profit. While the difference between the two contract is huge, workers may have little 
idea on what contract they have signed in the recruitment process due to their less 
knowledge on labor laws and the obscure names of the two contract (one as Laowu, the 
other as Laodong, which both indicates labor in a broader sense).  
Finally, to eliminate future risks of disputes on social security, workers may be told 
to sign a voluntary statement of renouncing their insurances. Although unimaginable as it 
seems, workers can be easily persuaded to relinquish their rights on social security, not 
only because of their eager to get a job but also because that the unintegrated security 
deposit systems in different provinces have made it hard and even impossible for migrant 
workers to transfer their social security account between cities or from urban to rural 
areas. For example, while insurances on maternity and injuries are nontransferable, 
pension, unemployment, and medical insurances will be cut down when transferred to 
different provinces. Besides, the pension has to be paid for 15 years for a worker to 
become a qualified recipient, but pensions that are paid after age 40 (50 for male) cannot 
be accounted as transferable pensions. In fact, because of these obstacles and the 
constraints on household registration, a recent study has found that the enrollment rate of 
migrant workers in the social insurance scheme is only around 20 to 30 percent (Zhang 
2019). 
5.3.2    Between factories and dispatch agencies 
In addition to tamper with the compacts between temporary workers, dispatch 
agencies also cooperate with their client firms to eliminate certain legal risks and 
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limitations. Since 2012, a series of legal documents have tightened the use of agency 
labor in China. The latest and most rigorous piece of regulation is the 2014 Interim 
Provisions on Labor Dispatch, which limited the proportion of dispatch workers in 
enterprises’ entire workforce to a maximum of 10 percent.  
The regulation has largely increased labor costs and reduced productivity. To deal 
with the 10 percent restriction, many agencies started to convert their dispatch relation 
with client factories into outsourcing relations, so that agency workers are sent out under 
the guise of ‘outsourced’ workers. The difference is that the main component of the 
contract between the agency and factory is shifted from labor to tasks. Instead of buying 
labor from agencies and directly manage these workers, factories contract out their 
production tasks to the dispatch agencies. The later still sign labor contracts with its 
workers but are responsible for the management of workers in accomplishing the 
production using the facilities from the factory. The agency receives payments from 
client firms based on the quantity and quality of the task finished. 
Technically, outsourcing is governed by the Contract Law rather than Labor 
Contract Law, so that certain regulations do not apply to the parties under this 
relationship. Besides, factories are also completely irresponsible to any disputes occurred 
between workers, because the management party has been shifted to the agencies. 
Previous studies have shown that due to lack of regulation on labor outsourcing, this 
method has been largely used among manufacturing enterprises, and it can be easily 
ached by changing the contract documentation and the taxation arrangement (Feng 2019). 
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6.    WHY CONSENT? THE AGENCY AND RESISTENCE OF TEMPORARY 
WORKERS 
In recent years, an optimistic view on Chinese workers' empowerment has appeared 
in both media and academia after the 2010 Honda strikes and the following protests in 
other foreign-owned manufacturers (Lee 2016). Supporters have since praised these 
large-scale unrests as evidence of growing resistance, grievance, and right awareness 
among workers of young generations (Leung & So 2012, Zhang 2015, Chen & Tang 
2013). Emotionally appealing as it seems though, few reports have been able to address 
the prevalence of temporary labor usages in the current market, which should have 
triggered more discontent and intensified the labor-capital relationships because the 
system is not only detrimental to labor conditions but also violates regulations that 
intended to protect labor rights. Therefore, an important question arrives at this paper’s 
concern: apart from the reduced full-time jobs available in an order-driven seasonal 
market, why would young workers willing to become temporary labor and commit to the 
exploitation of dispatch agencies? 
Drawing on my conversations with temporary workers, I find that three factors have 
been the key to understand the motivation behind their choices. First, seasonal labor 
provides high economic incentives that many bonus earners could not resist. Secondly, 
due to harsh management on the assembly line, intervals between temporary jobs provide 
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chances for workers to periodically escape from the arduous working condition. And 
finally, workers highlight doing temporary job as exercising control over their labor 
power. For many workers, working for the factory is the compromise they made for 
survival so that long-term manufacturing work is seen as a surrender to the factory 
regime. This is especially true for day laborers, who have developed socialistic framings 
to justify their behaviors as a posture to resist the commodification of labor. 
6.1    ECONOMIC INCENTIVES AND FREE MOBILITY 
The high economic incentives are certainly the main reason behind the motivation. 
Chen, a 23-year-old worker from Henan said: 
The factory's wages are relatively low, less than 4,000, which is definitely not 
enough to live in Shanghai…. But the treatment of temporary work is better. If we 
leave after three months of work and take the Fanfei, our income is higher than 
those of regular workers. Naturally, no one is willing to do formal work.10 
 
 Indeed, if workers can find several temporary jobs to cover a whole year course, 
their earning would be much higher than full-time workers. In fact, this is exactly what 
many workers are doing throughout the year. As calculated in Table 1., return bonus 
earners who continuously seek temporary work in the two months mode could earn 
15,000 RMB more than a full-time worker each year. 
Wang is originally from the north, but in the past two years, he has traveled in the 




Chedun at the end of June 2019 when he just finished his temporary works in Kunshan 
industrial zone, a leading manufacturing area adjacent to Shanghai: 
The local dispatch market [at Kunshan] has been purged by the states, so I came to 
Chedun to find some opportunities. It’s about August, you know, the high season of 
Fanfei is coming along.11 
 
Because public transportation is convenient and cheap in mainland China, a few 
dozens of RMB could buy Wang a bus ticket to anywhere in the Yangtze river delta. “We 
would call places like Chedun and Kunshan ‘the base’, where there is a network of 
dispatch and plenty of work demand.” With one backpack and few clothes, Wang is 
always able to travel to different “bases" at ease and relocate himself in the right niche of 
the labor market during different seasons.  
This free mobility to seek generous bonuses in different places also suggests that 
workers can navigate their path between the precarity of temporary hiring and the 
structural obstacles in the social security system. As the previous section has revealed, 
the social security deposit is hard to transfer between different provinces, which means 
that if a worker went back to his hometown when he is old, he might not be able to 
receive full pensions and insurances. However, since the source of return bonus is from 
social security, the return bonus system provides a way for workers to convert these 
future securities into current earnings, to transform a probably unrealizable welfare into 
real money that they can acquire immediately. In other words, workers can take 
advantage of the return bonus system as an intermediate tool to overcome the obstacles of 





6.2    ESCAPING THE DESPOTIC CONTROL  
Temporary work also serves as a way to escape long-term despotic control in the 
factory. Because of the harsh management at the shop floor, long-term factory work is 
hard to endure. A number of workers have described their work in factories as abusive, 
inhumane, and emotionally unbearable. Therefore, workers prefer temporary jobs so that 
they don’t have to stay in the factory all the time. The intervals between different 
temporary jobs can provide periodical relief from the arduous working condition. 
Chen used to work in the factory when he first came to Shanghai, but he couldn't 
stand the management system: 
 "The foreman at the assembly shop doesn't treat you as a human being…The only 
thing he wants is to hurry up and finish today's task…If you do something wrong, 
he will scold you as a bloody dog.” 12 
 
“Dehumanization", "Inferior to pigs and dogs", "No dignity", these are the word he 
often mentioned when describing his experiences. Brother Long, an experienced worker 
around his 30s, further discuss the subtle difference in the psychological status between 
full-time and temporary employee:  
You tend to think that you are a person who belongs to this factory after entering it. 
But in fact, the team leaders give you too much pressure. They scold you and beat 
you, which makes you feel being excluded and that you don’t belong here at 
all…Most people can't stand at this stage, so they run away if they had a chance. 
But if you do temporary works and day labors, you would know that you are 
supplementary, and you don’t belong to the factory. So even if you have been used 
as livestock, you will not feel excluded. After all, I will leave when the work is 
finished. Even if they mess with me, I’ll just stop working anyway, they can't 
control me, what else can they do to me? ... [pause]... If he [the foreman] dares to 






Long’s experience suggests that doing temporary work is a strategic move for 
workers to detach themselves from the factory regime. By maintaining only temporal 
relations with factories, workers reserve a way to escape from the despotic control, that is, 
to quit jobs when one’s job is finished. This need to detach from the factory regime also 
coincides with the lure of return bonus. When Wang recalls his experience, he said:  
I was in Kunshan, Jiangsu in 2017, and have challenged the factory for several 
times these years, but I ran away every time after earning the return bonus, I can’t 
bear the days when I have to wear ESD garments (anti-dust and static clothes), go 
through security and see no sunlight every day.14 
 
For these workers, shifting between factory jobs brings relief and generous bonuses 
after heavy load of works. Thus, few people can stay in the factory so long enough to 
become a full-time worker. However, this often leads them to wander between the edge 
of being employed and unemployed. For instance, when I first met Chen at the end of 
June 2019, he is doing manual day labor to cover his daily expense. But he also considers 
going back to the factory because desirable day labors are not very easy to find. On most 
occasions, workers will eventually fall onto either side of the poles, either continue to 
seek seasonal work in different factories or becoming a slacker that only perform day 
labors, totally escaped from the factory regime.  
Xing is a vivid example of the second type. When Xing first came to Shanghai, he 
worked in a small factory to learn A/C installation, but he soon left because of the harsh 
working conditions. On his second job, Xing entered an electronic factory. He also stayed 
for a while but couldn't stand the environment and ran away without resignation. This 
time Xing left Shanghai and went to Zhonghua Park, another “base” in Suzhou, Zhejiang 




hospital and tries to become a human volunteer of drug trials. The reward is a few 
thousand RMB. “Fast Money”, he said. But he was eventually screened out due to high 
blood pressure. In recent days, Xing ended up traveling back to Chedun, seeking day 
labors in the suburb of Shanghai.15 
6.3    THE REFUSAL TO WORK 
Escaping is never the only theme in the narrative of many temporary workers. 
Workers seldom consider their leaving the factory as a lack of endurance and diligence. 
Instead, they insist that it is their way of taking control of their labor power. This kind of 
framing usually begins by establishing the antagonistic boundary between capitalists and 
workers, by consciously framing themselves as proletariats: “Going to the factory is to 
become a factory dog. I don’t want to work for the factories, they only want us to make 
profit for them. They are all capitalists.” When asked about the working condition in 
shanghai, one said,  
“It’s not that Shanghai has the worst management in the factory, everywhere the 
factory is the same, all the bosses are the same conscienceless, they all want to 
suppress you to do more work.” “We are Proletariats. We have been bearing the 
burden of the three mountains [capitalism, bureaucratism, and imperialism] for a 
long time, and it is so heavy.”16 
 
If factory is framed as the enemy of the workers, then reentering the factory when 
running out of money is often considered to be a “battle” or a “fight”. Workers usually 
greet each other by asking “have you fought with the factory recently?” or start chatting 





in challenging the factory again.” However, losing the “fight” or running away from the 
factory is not deemed as a shameful thing to do. After all, working in the factory is just a 
temporary compromise when they cannot afford themselves living independently. Instead, 
those who continue working in the factory or who often seek factory jobs can even be 
considered shameful, a surrender to capitalism. These people would be called “factory 
dogs” for their docile and betrayal. 
At one evening in the hall of the LD agency, a worker expresses his compromise to 
the factory and was scorned by others.  
“We are proletariat workers, there’s nothing meaningful about challenging or 
fighting against the black factory, just behave yourself and be a factory dog. We are 
just dust, you know, tiny and insignificant dust. If you want to survive this society, 
you can only be dust.” Soon after what he said, a man by his side despised at 
him: “listen to what you said, you look just like a factory dog.” Another expressed 
the same view: “Hell, work for those people? No, I won’t become a factory dog.”17 
 
The idea of refusal to work in the factory is much more prominent in day laborers 
like Xing, who constantly drop out factories and work only for survival needs. These 
workers refer to their status of not working as “Guabi”. In the literal sense, Guabi refers 
to “hanging something on the wall”, indicating the behavior of putting something on the 
wall and not using it. In the sub-culture among day laborers, however, the word is often 
used to describe workers’ status of just hanging around and doing nothing productive. It 
is also used to describe their choice of leaving their capacity or productive power unused. 
One worker explains why he choose to drop out of the factory in this way: 
 “Working for the factory is just being exploited…every time I think about it, I felt 
agitated. I felt boring and tedious, so I eventually choose to “Guabi” … I have been 







 When asked “you still have to work when you run out of money”, he answered 
cynically: “I would still choose to “Guabi” instead of working for them even if I am 
starving to death.”19 
Phenomenologist Max Scheler argued that resistance is a part of ordinary existence. 
If the social worlds resist our purposes and plans, we in turn resist the imposition of 
authority and the rule it assigns to us (1963). But when lacked necessary tools, this 
opposition can be harsh and tragic, turning outward resistance into inward self-
destruction. Despite the faintest class consciousness temporary workers have gained, for 
these who lived and traveled alone in the cities and lacked long-term solidarity with other 
workers, formal protest and alliance were never possible due to lack of mobilization 
resources. Thus, the only resistance that left to them is to exercise their final control on 
their own body—an ability to not sell their labor power, an agency to stay unproductive, 





7.    CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSIONS 
Over the past few decades, China has acceded remarkable economic performance as 
the world factory and has profoundly influenced the landscape of global trade and its 
competitive pattern. The impetus for this success has been largely attributed to China’s 
abundant supply of labor and comparatively low wages for workers. However, as the 
profit of OEM industries has been limited due to rising wages and regional competition, 
flexible employments was introduced to further reduce labor cost. In this context, this 
study looks into the organizational forces of dispatch agencies that facilitated the system 
of flexible employment. It explores a flexible recruiting process in the manufacturing 
labor market that operates according to the seasonal demand. During peak production 
seasons, labor dispatch agencies attract temporary workers into factory work by offering 
strong economic incentives. When production demands are low, these agencies drop 
labor prices and hiring need to maintain the basic functionality of the factory. In doing so, 
temporary labor arrangement releases abundant workforces from full-time employment, 
thereby reducing the pressure of total labor supply in the current labor market. While 
these arrangements have increased workers' risk of unemployment and loss of social 
security, labor agencies obscure their labor contract with workers and their business 
contracts with factories so as to circumvent legal responsibilities, putting workers into 
much more precarious situation. 
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This study enters an ongoing conversation on the increasingly informal, casual, and 
nonstandard labor conditions in a neoliberal global economy. While the growing trend of 
informal labor and temporary employment has been observed global wide (Standing 2014; 
McDowell et al. 2009; Lee & Koffman 2012), the shortening of job tenure among young 
Chinese migrant workers have also been recorded in recent years. As a national 
representative study shows, workers who born in the 1980s held on to jobs for 2.68 years 
on average, but for those born in the 1990s, the average job duration is only 0.93 years. 
The survey finds an overall rate of 37.9 percent in “waiting for employment” mode, 
either unemployed or with no formal jobs (Tsinghua Sociology Research Team 2013). 
Many studies and reports have attributed this trend to workers' individual characteristics: 
the increasing aversion to repetitive work on the assembly line, the temptation of exciting 
city life, and the lack of farming experience that fostered diligence and endurance (Wang 
& Huang 2014; Wang 2019). This study, however, explores the structural factors that 
influence the choice of many young migrants. It reveals how the adoption of temporary 
employment helps factories to shift the burden of labor cost onto workers in order to 
overcome production fluctuation. 
This study also offers a contradictory image of Chinese workers to the optimistic 
narratives of many scholars. While previous studies taken place in the self-contained 
production context of shop floor have discovered the rise of both class consciousness and 
mobilization ability, this study finds a rather underdeveloped resistance among temporary 
workers. Because temporary workers move constantly between factories and even cities, 
social ties are hardly maintained, so as to long-term work solidarity. This atomizing 
effect eventually results in a much more fragile class relationship and a lack of 
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mobilization resources. As Merton has argued, individual adaptation and deviant 
behavior depend on people’s reactions to the cultural goals and the institutional means to 
achieve them (Merton 1938). With no signs of status raising through repetitive work and 
lack of mobilization power to address individual grievances, temporary workers were 
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